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Constitutional Cases 2016:  
An Overview 
Benjamin L. Berger, Sonia Lawrence, and Spiros Vavougios* 
We are delighted to offer this introduction to the yearly volume of 
articles flowing from Osgoode Hall Law School’s annual Constitutional 
Cases Conference. The articles in this volume offer insightful and 
illuminating analysis of the constitutional jurisprudence from the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s 2016 term. In this introduction, we set the 
frame for these articles with an overview of the “constitutional year” at 
the Supreme Court, identifying some key patterns, themes, and issues 
that gave 2016 its distinctive mark. This overview is organized into three 
parts. As is the custom for these introductions, in Part I, we begin by 
offering a view of the constitutional jurisprudence of the Court in 2016 
“on the numbers”. In Part II we reflect on two larger issues that shaped 
the Court’s work in 2016: retirements and debates about appointments, 
and the pressing question of reconciliation and the Constitution. Finally, 
Part III examines the decisions themselves, directing the reader to 
articles in this volume which provide in-depth analysis and offering our 
observations about how these cases participate in broader themes and 
patterns that have been in our sightlines at the Constitutional Cases 
conference over the past many years.  
I. PART I: 2016: THE YEAR IN REVIEW,  
ON THE NUMBERS 
From the perspective of the numbers alone, it was a quiet year at the 
Court, particularly in constitutional law. In total, the Court decided 56 
cases in the 2016 calendar year. Of the 56 cases decided, only 12 are 
identified as Constitutional decisions (2 Federalism cases and 10 Charter 
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cases),1 and 4 cases identified deal with constitutional principles or 
values.2 In addition, the Court granted a motion extending the suspended 
declaration of invalidity in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General).3  
This year’s figures continue a steady decline in the overall number of 
judgments released by the Court in recent years (79 total cases in 2014, 
68 in 2015, and 56 in 2016). Much more notable is what looks like a 
dramatic drop in the number of constitutional judgments released (19 in 
2014 and 28 in 2015 to 12 in 2016). The proportion of the Court’s 
judgments devoted to constitutional issues in 2015 was approximately  
40 per cent. In 2016, this figure halved to approximately 21 per cent. It is 
difficult to account for this precipitous decline in the number and 
proportion of constitutional cases. Is it simply a product of the 
vicissitudes of how issues arrive at the Court? Might it be attributable to 
the fact that the Court was short staffed after Justice Cromwell retired on 
September 1, 2016? Or are there deeper conclusions to be drawn? This is 
certainly an issue worth tracking in the coming years. 
Looking deeper into the 12 constitutional cases that were issued by the 
Court in 2016, it seems that applicants enjoyed considerable success in 
advancing their claims. Specifically, in 10 of the 12 constitutional cases, 
applicants were successful (a success rate of approximately 83 per cent). 
This includes partial successes, as in Conférence des juges (in which 3 of 
                                                                                                                       
1 The Constitutional cases identified are: Conférence des juges de paix magistrats du 
Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2016] S.C.J. No. 39, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 116, 2016 SCC 39 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Conférence des juges”]; R. v. Williamson, [2016] S.C.J. No. 28, [2016] 1 
S.C.R. 741, 2016 SCC 28 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Williamson”]; Daniels v. Canada (Indian Affairs 
and Northern Development), [2016] S.C.J. No. 12, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 99, 2016 SCC 12 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Daniels”]; Rogers Communications Inc. v. Châteauguay (City), [2016] S.C.J. No. 23, 
[2016] 1 S.C.R. 467, 2016 SCC 23 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rogers Communications”]; R. v. Saeed, 
[2016] S.C.J. No. 24, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 518, 2016 SCC 24 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Saeed”]; R. v. 
Jordan, [2016] S.C.J. No. 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 63, 2016 SCC 27 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Jordan”]; R. 
v. Cawthorne, [2016] S.C.J. No. 32, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 983, 2016 SCC 32 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Cawthorne”]; R. v. Lloyd, [2016] S.C.J. No. 13, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 130, 2016 SCC 13 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Lloyd”]; R. v. Vassell, [2016] S.C.J. No. 26, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 625, 2016 SCC 26 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Vassell”]; Canada (Attorney General) v. Chambre des notaires du Québec, 
[2016] S.C.J. No. 20, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 336, 2016 SCC 20 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chambres des 
notaires”]; R. v. K.R.J., [2016] S.C.J. No. 31, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 906, 2016 SCC 31 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “K.R.J.”]; R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, [2016] S.C.J. No. 14, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 180, 2016 
SCC 14 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Safarzadeh-Markhali”]. 
2 Commission scolaire de Laval v. Syndicat de l’enseignement de la région de Laval, 
[2016] S.C.J. No. 8, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 29, 2016 SCC 8 (S.C.C.); Endean v. British Columbia, [2016] 
S.C.J. No. 42, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 162, 2016 SCC 42 (S.C.C.); Morasse v. Nadeau-Dubois, [2016] 
S.C.J. No. 44, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 232, 2016 SCC 44 (S.C.C.); Windsor (City) v. Canadian Transit Co., 
[2016] S.C.J. No. 54, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 617, 2016 SCC 54 (S.C.C.). 
3 Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2016] S.C.J. No. 4, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 13, 2016 SCC 
4 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Carter II”]. 
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the 5 impugned provisions were struck down) and K.R.J. (in which 1 of 
the 2 impugned provisions was read down). Decisions of lower courts 
did not fare particularly well: of these 10 successful cases, seven were 
appeals of lower court decisions. In the 10 cases in which the Court 
found a constitutional violation, the Court employed a variety of 
remedies, reading down provisions in 2 cases,4 striking down provisions 
in 3 cases,5 and issuing declaratory relief in 5 cases.6 
What can we discern from the year’s cases about the roles of the 
individual judges of the Court in shaping the Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence? Notably, Karakatsanis and Moldaver JJ. authored the most 
constitutional decisions (4 each); in terms of total judgments written, 
Brown and Karakatsanis JJ. take the lead with, respectively, 7 and 6 
decisions. Justice Karakatsanis’ strong voice in the Court’s jurisprudence in 
recent years is particularly interesting in light of early commentary that, as a 
newly appointed jurist, she was “struggle[ing] to make an impact”.7 On the 
other side of the ledger, Abella and Brown JJ. each authored two dissenting 
opinions in constitutional cases. If we move beyond the constitutional 
cases, however, many will be interested to see that one of the Court’s 
newest members, Côté J., authored the largest number of dissents, at 10. 
The first woman appointed to the Court directly from private practice, Côté 
J.’s tone and industry suggest that she may come to command an influence 
like her two “straight-from-practice” predecessors, Sopinka and Binnie JJ.  
The Court released 5 unanimous constitutional decisions: 3 of which 
were authored by the Court’s most senior justices (2 by Chief Justice 
McLachlin, who has been on the Court since 1989 and 1 by Abella J., 
appointed to the SCC in 2004), 1 joint decision by Karakatsanis, Wagner, 
and Côté JJ., and 1 joint decision authored by Wagner and Gascon JJ.  
Interesting though they are — and although they offer some watching 
briefs for the constitutional work of the Court in the coming years — the 
numbers can capture neither the significance of the cases decided, nor the 
character of the year as defined by the key issues that the Court faced as 
an institution. It is to the latter issues that we now turn. 
                                                                                                                       
4 The cases where the impugned provisions were read down include: K.R.J., supra, note 1 
and Chambres des notaires, supra, note 1. 
5 The Court struck down impugned provisions in Safarzadeh-Markhali, supra, note 1; 
Lloyd, supra, note 1; Conference des juges, supra, note 1;  
6 Declaratory relief was provided in the following cases: Jordan, supra, note 1; Williamson, 
supra, note 1; Vassel, supra, note 1; Rogers Communications, supra, note 1; Daniels, supra, note 1. 
7 “A Supreme Court Justice struggles to make an impact”, Editorial, The Globe and Mail 
(April 3, 2013), online: Globe and Mail <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/a-
supreme-court-justice-struggles-to-make-an-impact/article10748372/>.  
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II. PART II: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE INSTITUTION 
1. The Judges of the Court: A Retirement and an Appointment  
This year illustrated the pace of replacement and renewal on the 
Supreme Court. When we opened the year, only two judges had been 
appointed by someone other than Prime Minister Harper: Chief Justice 
McLachlin (appointed to the Court by PM Mulroney and named Chief 
Justice by PM Chrétien); Justice Abella (appointed by PM Martin). By the 
end of 2016, Justice Malcolm Rowe, the first appointment of the Trudeau 
(fils) era was sitting, and Chief Justice McLachlin had announced her 
retirement, heralding the coming appointment of a second.  
Justice Cromwell retired on September 2, 2016, having been involved in 
103 constitutional decisions and 427 overall decisions. Over the course of 
his tenure at the Court, Cromwell J. wrote many key constitutional 
decisions, leaving a strong mark on the jurisprudence of the Court, 
particularly in the Court’s legal rights jurisprudence. For example, in the 
context of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,8 his 
noteworthy constitutional cases include: R. v. Cornell9 (reasonableness of 
authorized search executed without announcement and forced/hard entry to 
preserve evidence); R. v. Vu10 (search and seizure of computers without 
specific prior judicial authorization); R. v. Spencer11 (reasonable expectation 
of privacy and engagement of informational privacy in the context of 
subscriber information associated with an IP address received from an 
Internet Service Provider); R. v. Fearon12 (search of cellphones incident to 
arrest); and Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of 
Canada13 (authorization of sweeping searches in law offices pursuant to 
anti-money laundering and terrorist financing provisions found to violate 
sections 7 and 8 of the Charter and undermine solicitor-client privilege).14  
                                                                                                                       
8 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
9 R. v. Cornell, [2010] S.C.J. No. 31, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 142, 2010 SCC 31 (S.C.C.). 
10 R. v. Vu, [2013] S.C.J. No. 6, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657, 2013 SCC 6 (S.C.C.). 
11 R. v. Spencer, [2014] S.C.J. No. 43, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212, 2014 SCC 43 (S.C.C.). 
12 R. v. Fearon, [2014] S.C.J. No. 77, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, 2014 SCC 77 (S.C.C.). 
13 Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, [2015] S.C.J.  
No. 7, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 401, 2015 SCC 7 (S.C.C.). 
14 Other notable constitutional decisions authored by Cromwell J. include: Reference Re 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] S.C.J. No. 61, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 45, 2010 SCC 61 (S.C.C.) 
(Cromwell J.’s judgment determined the issues before the Court, which was split as to the validity of 
the impugned provisions relating to assisted human reproduction on Division of Powers grounds); 
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 14, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 
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Justice Cromwell’s announcement of his retirement came as 
something of a surprise (given his age, he could have stayed a further 
decade) and it inaugurated vigorous public discourse about his 
replacement. It would be the first use of a new set of appointments 
procedures which, inter alia, created an independent panel to advise on 
appointments, required that candidates be functionally bilingual, but  
did not include in its mandate anything about the convention of regional 
representation in appointments.15 This disturbed the Atlantic Provinces 
Trial Lawyer’s Association so much that they filed an application on 
September 19, 2016 with the Nova Scotia Supreme Court. Citing 
Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6 (Nadon Reference),16 they 
sought a declaration that departing from the tradition of regional 
representation would be unconstitutional unless treated as a 
constitutional amendment.17  
The announcement, in late October 2016, of the nomination of 
Malcolm Rowe J. calmed those particular anxieties.18 Despite the fact 
that he graduated from Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto, his 
Newfoundland credentials are well established. With the exception of a 
few years in Ottawa, Rowe J. spent his legal career in Newfoundland 
and Labrador, where he was appointed to the Trial Division in 1999 
                                                                                                                       
693, 2015 SCC 14 (S.C.C.) (whether the principle of cooperative federalism can constrain 
Parliament’s legislative power over the destruction of long-gun registry data); Caron v. Alberta, 
[2015] S.C.J. No. 54, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 511, 2015 SCC 56 (S.C.C.) (language rights in the context of 
Alberta’s Alberta Languages Act, which posits that provincial laws and regulations be enacted, 
printed, and published in English only); Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United 
Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401, [2013] S.C.J. No. 62, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 733, 2013 SCC 62 
(S.C.C.) (freedom of expression in the context of the Personal Information Protection Act and union 
video-taping and photographing individuals crossing picket lines for use in labour dispute); R. v. 
Kokopenace, [2015] S.C.J. No. 28, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 398, 2015 SCC 28 (S.C.C.) (writing in dissent 
with McLachlin C.J.C., he asserted that the representativeness of a jury roll is tethered to the right to 
a jury trial and the right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal, as enshrined in s. 11 of 
the Charter); and R. v. Jordan, [2016] S.C.J. No. 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631, 2016 SCC 27 (S.C.C.) 
(writing for the Dissent, he criticized the Majority’s new framework for dealing with the right to be 
tried within a reasonable time, cautioning that a numerical ceilings approach will be inadequate in 
accounting for fact and case-specific complexities). 
15 The Advisory Board was established, and the Terms of Reference approved by the 
Governor in Council (“GIC”) on July 29, 2016 (Order in Council PC 2016-0693).  
16 [2014] S.C.J. No. 21, 2014 SCC 21 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nadon Reference”]. 
17 Atlantic Provinces Trial Lawyers Association v. The Right Honourable Prime Minister of 
Canada and the Governor General of Canada (19 September 2016), Halifax, NSSC SH-455561 
(notice of application). 
18 “Prime Minister announces nomination of Mr. Justice Malcolm Rowe to the Supreme 
Court of Canada” (17 October 2016), online: Prime Minist Can <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/10/ 
17/prime-minister-announces-nomination-mr-justice-malcolm-rowe-supreme-court-canada>. 
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and the Court of Appeal in 2001.19 But other court watchers, primed by 
section 8(f) of the Board’s Terms of Reference (“…in establishing a 
list of qualified candidates, [the Advisory Board should] seek to 
support the Government of Canada’s intent to achieve a gender-
balanced Supreme Court of Canada that also reflects the diversity of 
members of Canadian society, including Indigenous peoples, persons 
with disabilities and members of linguistic, ethnic and other minority 
communities including those whose members’ gender identity or 
sexual orientation differs from that of the majority…”), and the 
statements of the Trudeau government on reconciliation and diversity, 
were less impressed.20  
The gentle “grilling” Rowe J. received from the Members of the 
House of Commons justice committee and Senate legal affairs committee 
(along with Bloc Québécois and Green MPs, with law students from 
across Canada in attendance) is interesting viewing for initiates. One 
watches a delicate dance as the questioners and the nominee try to meet 
the serious constraints of the process while still asking questions, and 
offering answers, with some semblance of substance.21 Ultimately, the 
Q&A process seems to reveal more about our public and political 
concerns about judges than it did about Rowe J. or his views on critical 
legal questions.  
The appointments process is, as this article goes to press, gearing up 
again for the selection of Chief Justice McLachlin’s replacement, with 
applications due on September 15, 2017.22 The process of appointments  
 
                                                                                                                       
19 Supreme Court of Canada, “Supreme Court of Canada - Biography - Malcolm Rowe”,  
(1 January 2001), online: Supreme Court of Canada <http://www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/bio-eng.aspx? 
id=malcolm-rowe>. 
20 Jennifer Taylor, “Preserving regional representation on the SCC; but what about diversity?”, 
(20 October 2016), online: CBA Natl <http://www.nationalmagazine.ca/Blog/October-2016/Preserving-
regional-representation-on-the-SCC;-but.aspx>; Michael Tutton, “Advocates for minority Supreme Court 
judge disappointed by Trudeau’s pick”, Tor Star (18 October 2016), online: <https://www.thestar.com/ 
news/canada/2016/10/18/advocates-for-minority-supreme-court-judge-disappointed-by-trudeaus-pick.html>;  
Nina Corfu, “Another white man on Supreme Court means people of colour ‘shut out’”, CBC News  
(18 October 2016), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/supreme-court-appointment-
aboriginal-indigenous-african-canadian-diversity-1.3809776>. 
21 John Paul Tasker, “Supreme Court nominee Malcolm Rowe grilled on French, diversity 
and Aboriginal rights”, CBC News (25 October 2016) online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/news/ 
politics/malcolm-rowe-committee-questions-1.3820318>; Canada, “Public Record: Parliamentarian 
panel questions Malcolm Rowe”, online: CPAC <http://www.cpac.ca/en/programs/public-record/ 
episodes/49446035> [hereinafter “Tasker”]. 
22 Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, “Supreme Court of Canada 
Appointment Process - 2017” (26 November 2015), online: <https://perma.cc/XN38-ETK7>. 
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itself has been the subject of a Committee Report (which tended to 
support the process followed for Rowe J. in all aspects).23 Observers 
have a bit more clarity this time around on the regional representation 
matter: the Advisory Board is specifically seeking candidates from 
“Western Canada (British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and 
Manitoba) and Northern Canada (Northwest Territories, Nunavut, 
Yukon)”.24 Still very unclear is whether the commitment to functional 
bilingualism will, as some have predicted, serve to preclude the 
realization of other expressions of diversity, and in particular the 
appointment of an Indigenous justice, and whether there is any real 
significance to the use and public release of questionnaires filled out in 
the application process by the successful candidate.25  
2. Reconciliation and The Constitution 
It has been some years since Chief Justice McLachlin suggested that 
the threshold work for the Charter was completed in the first generation 
of the Court’s decision-making,26 leading us to a constitutional moment 
focused on the “imperative of achieving reconciliation between Canada’s 
First Nations and the Crown”.27 These issues attained a new level of 
prominence this year, perhaps ironically, through the efforts of the 
Department of Canadian Heritage to celebrate the 150th anniversary of 
Confederation by branding it Canada150. The government described 
Canada150 as an opportunity to join together and celebrate the country’s  
 
                                                                                                                       
23 Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 9th Report: THE NEW PROCESS 
FOR JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (Anthony 
Housefather Chair) 22 Feb. 2017 (42nd Parl. 1st Sess). See also Government Response to the 9th 
Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 13 June 2017, online: <https://perma.cc/ 
CC8E-ZTFV>. 
24 Supra, note 22 (note that the question of what precisely makes a candidate “from” a 
particular region seems to be somewhat flexible). 
25 Ian MacLeod, “Supreme Court appointment makes history while keeping traditional 
regional balance”, National Post (18 October 2016) online: <http://nationalpost.com/news/politics/ 
supreme-court-appointment-makes-history-while-keeping-traditional-regional-balance/wcm/6bbd51ef- 
24e4-428b-8bb9-863bb91dde8a>; Canada, supra, note 23. 
26 Kirk Makin, “Ten years as top judge and she’s still losing sleep”, The Globe and Mail  
(7 January 2010), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/ten-years-as-top-judge-
and-shes-still-losing-sleep/article1366103/>. 
27 The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, “Defining Moments: The Canadian 
Constitution”, Remarks delivered on 5 February 2013 at the Canadian Club of Ottawa, online: Supreme 
Court of Canada <https://perma.cc/TK2F-JGZP>. 
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rich linguistic, cultural, and regional diversity, history, and heritage.28 But 
this state-sponsored celebration and the events that were planned under 
this umbrella had the interesting, if no doubt unintended effect, of 
focusing attention on the genesis of the Canadian state, and the 
dispossession and erasure of Indigenous sovereignty that it required. 
Critics seized the opportunity to reframe what British North America Act, 
1867 accomplished — not as a matter for celebration but as (another, 
failed) attempt at erasing Indigenous sovereignties.  
Canada150 and the critical discourse it prompted closely followed 
and built on discussions following the 2015 release of the Final Report 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Senator Murray Sinclair, 
who chaired that Commission, this year reminded Canadians that 1867 
marked the beginning of an abusive relationship that culminated in the 
precarious economic and social positioning of Indigenous peoples in 
Canada today.29 Even the Minister of Justice Jody Wilson-Raybould, 
the first Indigenous person to hold that position, commented “It is hard 
to celebrate 150 years of colonialism.”30 Indigenous voices in social 
media echoed and supported the critique, pressing for more attention 
to how Canada150 might be seen and understood in Indigenous 
communities. Indigenous artist Isaac Murdoch, from Serpent River 
First Nation started the #Resistance150 hashtag to challenge the 
erasure of Indigenous history.31 Indigenous organizers including 
Freddy Stonypoint and Candace Day Neveau, planned to erect a teepee 
on the lawn of Parliament as a “ceremonial reoccupation” during the 
Canada Day celebrations.32 Their efforts produced confrontation with 
                                                                                                                       
28 Government of Canada, Canada 150, online: Government of Canada <https://perma.cc/ 
5B86-382V>. 
29 Chinta Puxley, “Many Indigenous people see little reason to celebrate Canada’s 150th 
birthday” Metro (13 June 2017) online: <http://www.metronews.ca/news/canada/2017/06/13/indigenous- 
people-see-little-reason-to-celebrate-canada-150.html> [hereinafter “Puxley”]. 
30 The Honourable Jody Wilson-Raybould, “Separate Journeys, Similar Path: Truth and 
Reconciliation in Canada and South Africa”, Remarks delivered on 30 March 2017 at University of Cape 
Town Law School, South Africa, online: Government of Canada <https://perma.cc/6FHM-MKHB>. 
31 Puxley, supra, note 29. 
32 Jorge Barrera, “Nine arrested after RCMP blocks teepee raising on Parliament Hill” APTN 
News (29 June 2017) online: <http://aptnnews.ca/2017/06/29/nine-arrested-after-rcmp-blocks-teepee-
raising-on-parliament-hill/>; Alex Ballingall, “Teepee erected on Parliament Hill highlights pain of 
Canada 150, activists say”, Toronto Star (29 June 2017), online: <https:// www.thestar.com/news/canada/ 
2017/06/29/canada-150-protesters-erect-teepee-on-parliament-hill.html>; The Canadian Press, “Sault 
group behind teepee on Parliament Hill”, Sault Star (29 June 2017) online: <http://www.saultstar.com/ 
2017/06/29/sault-group-behind-teepee-on-parliament-hill>; “Negotiated compromise produces ‘historic’ 
teepee raising on central Parliament Hill lawn”, APTN News (2017), online: <http://aptnnews.ca/ 
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the RCMP, arrests, and then a negotiated solution and ultimately, a 
visit to the teepee from the Prime Minister.33  
It is hard to predict what the impact of these national explorations of 
historical and contemporary injustices will be in the long term, and the 
various ways that they will generate constitutional litigation and doctrine, 
but with several significant cases involving Indigenous rights claims on the 
horizon, the prominence of these questions across legal, political, and 
public arenas feels unprecedented. Daniels v. Canada (Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development) was one of the most significant cases of the year, 
addressing complicated issues surrounding reconciliation not in the context 
of section 35, but, rather, out of the jurisdictional questions created by 
section 91(24) — which grants jurisdiction to the federal government over 
Indians and lands reserved for Indians.34 Writing for the Court, Abella J. 
begins the judgment with a tone that echoes the assertions of the Chief 
Justice surrounding our current constitutional moment:  
As the curtain opens wider and wider on the history of Canada’s 
relationship with its Indigenous peoples, inequities are increasingly 
revealed and remedies urgently sought. Many revelations have resulted 
in good faith policy and legislative responses, but the list of 
disadvantages remains robust. This case represents another chapter in 
the pursuit of reconciliation and redress in that relationship.35 
At issue in Daniels was whether Métis and non-status Indians are 
“Indians” within the meaning of section 91(24). In granting a declaration 
in the affirmative, the Court highlighted the practical utility that flows 
from such a declaration: previously, both federal and provincial 
governments denied responsibility for Métis and non-status Indians, 
leaving individuals in these groups in a “jurisdictional wasteland”36 that 
deprived them of funding and access to programs, services, and other 
intangible benefits that both provincial and federal governments 
recognized as necessities.37  
                                                                                                                       
2017/06/30/negotiated-compromise-produces-historic-teepee-raising-on-central-parliament-hill-lawn/>; 
“‘A state of crisis’: Indigenous group calls for change as Canada Day nears”, CBC News (2017), online:  
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/parliament-hill-indigenous-ceremony-june-29-1.4180411>.  
33 John Paul Tasker, “Justin Trudeau visits ‘reoccupation’ teepee on Parliament Hill”, CBC 
News (2017) online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-visits-reoccupation-teepee-1.4185758>. 
34 Daniels, supra, note 1.  
35 Id., at para. 1. 
36 Id., at para. 14.  
37 Id.  
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The evidentiary foundation relied on by the Court included many 
findings made by Phelan J. at the trial level, which established that various 
historical, philosophical, and linguistic contexts support the conclusion that 
“Indians” under section 91(24) is a broad term that was intended to 
encompass all Indigenous peoples in Canada.38 Although the decision 
resolves the jurisdictional tug-of-war surrounding Métis and non-status 
Indigenous peoples, the decision treated reconciliation in the context of 
federalism as narrow and aimed primarily at redress. Two articles in this 
collection consider the Daniels decision and its implications for 
reconciliation. Thomas Isaac and Arend Hoekstra focus not on the 
declaration the Court offered, but on the language it used in the decision. 
They highlight that this is the first decision where the Court uses the term 
“Indigenous” in a material way: whereas in previous cases the term is used 
as an adjective, in Daniels it is employed as a proper noun. The authors 
highlight the uncertainty of the scope and purpose of using Indigenous as a 
category of identity, while Ron Stevenson traces the way the decision on 
section 91(24) relies on argumentation from both the “framers’ intent” or 
“originalist” tradition, and from the progressive or “living tree” tradition, 
raising concerns about the way this embeds 19th century colonial and racist 
ideologies into contemporary constitutional interpretations. What seems 
clear from Daniels is that reconciliation in the context of section 91(24)  
will be limited to the redress of historic wrongs, and does not give rise to  
a duty to legislate.39 The precise nature of the obligations imposed by  
section 91(24) moving forward remains obscured; however, the Court’s use 
of “policy redress”40 as opposed to legal redress may suggest that the Court 
envisages Indigenous peoples and the federal government entering into 
dialogue, where a spectrum of needs and interests will be heard without the 
imposition of strict legal obligations on the government. Such a vision, of 
course, raises questions as to how institutional dynamics between the Court 
and the Legislature may be strained as we move further into the 
“constitutional moment” of reconciliation.  
Beyond Daniels, the judgments which will likely be released by the 
Court in 2017 reinforce the prominence and significance of questions 
about “reconciliation”. Ktunaxa will require that the Court consider an 
Indigenous claim for constitutional justice beyond sections 91(24) and 35.  
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The case involves the assertion of a religious freedom over the Qat’muk 
(Jumbo Valley) in British Columbia, the home of the venerated Grizzly 
Bear Spirit and has been argued mainly as a section 2(b) claim for 
religious freedoms.41 The implications for reconciliation go beyond 
redress. As John Borrows notes, constitutional limitations placed on 
spiritual rights are particularly injurious in the (neo)colonial context: 
It is one thing to place constitutional limits on material culture’s 
development, because doing so virtually drives that culture to physical 
poverty. However, when constitutional limits are placed on spirituality’s 
development, the law stoops even lower. It denies Indigenous people 
protection of the inner means to cope with the physical impoverishment 
that often developed as a result of European contact. Indigenous peoples’ 
religious freedoms should not hinge on historic non-Aboriginal contact, 
especially when non-Aboriginal Europeans were so harsh in their 
treatment of Indigenous religion after contact.42 
2017 has already seen a pair of cases on the duty to consult, including 
Clyde River,43 in which a unanimous Court provided the following 
caution: 
True reconciliation is rarely, if ever, achieved in courtrooms. Judicial 
remedies may seek to undo past infringements of Aboriginal and treaty 
rights, but adequate Crown consultation before project approval is 
always preferable to after-the-fact judicial remonstration following an 
adversarial process.44 
As we progress into the “era” of reconciliation, reflection on the 
concept’s historical and constitutional trajectory may help us explore 
whether the concept is capable of facilitating the healing of Indigenous-
Settler relations. In the transcript of their roundtable conversation, 
reproduced in this volume, Amar Bhatia, Beverley Jacobs, Jonathan 
Rudin, Douglas Sanderson, and Mark Walters consider these and other 
issues related to the idea of reconciliation. Bringing diverse expertise and 
experience, the group explored the promise and peril, history and 
trajectory of the notion of reconciliation and what it might require of us.  
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Does reconciliation obscure more than it reveals? Does it harken back to 
very early relationships between settlers and Indigenous peoples, such as 
those agreed upon in the Covenant Chain and Two-Row wampum, 
agreements which sought to solidify healthy relationships? Can the 
jurisprudence to this point support a robust version of reconciliation, or 
have the interpretations of section 35 so relied on essentializations that 
they are bound to produce cramped versions of Indigenous rights and 
title, rather than the self-governance or sovereignty that the section could 
otherwise encompass? Will reconciliation require that settler institutions 
fundamentally consider the depth of the sovereignty asserted by the 
colonial state? What is the end game of reconciliation? Is the settler state 
prepared to begin the process of recognizing sovereignties and providing 
redress, or will this reconciliation era prove to be a form of what legal 
historian Reva Siegel has termed “preservation through transformation”: 
a legal idea which seems to fundamentally revise the form and content of 
doctrine, but ultimately comes to accommodate and further the same 
underlying ideas as the law that came before?45 
III. PART III: A THEMATIC REVIEW OF THE 2016  
JURISPRUDENCE 
Marking its 20th anniversary this year, Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional 
Cases Conference offers attendees an invaluable review of the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, but each year is also a moment in an 
ongoing conversation about the themes and patterns that characterize the 
Court’s constitutional work. The articles included in this volume offer deep 
dives into many of the cases discussed below. But our purpose in what 
follows is to place these cases in the stream of certain trends, patterns, 
concerns, and debates that have emerged over the last 20 years. 
1. Co-Operative Federalism in Division of Powers Decisions 
Rogers Communications v. Châteauguay (City) (“Rogers Communi-
cations”) provides fodder for analyses of how division of powers 
jurisprudence creates and shapes the meaning and possibility of cooperative 
federalism. Rogers Communications Inc. (“Rogers”) tried to construct a  
 
                                                                                                                       
45 Reva Siegel, “Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of  
Status-Enforcing State Action” (1997) 49 Stan L. Rev. 1111. 
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new radiocommunication antenna system in the City of Châteauguay, 
pursuant to a spectrum licence, which requires that the company ensures 
adequate network coverage in the geographic areas covered by the licence. 
In response, the City passed a resolution authorizing the establishment of  
a reserve, prohibiting the construction of the antenna system for a period  
of two years (it was subsequently renewed for an additional two years), 
claiming it was concerned about the health and well-being of the residents 
surrounding the installation site.  
The Court was unanimous in concluding that the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity operated to render the impugned notice of 
reserve inapplicable; however, two conflicting decisions were generated 
regarding the pith and substance and thus vires of the resolution 
authorizing the impugned notice. Writing for the Majority, Wagner and 
Côté JJ. maintained that the pith and substance of the impugned notice 
was the siting of a radio communication antenna system, which amounts 
to the exercise of federal jurisdiction.46 Conversely, Gascon J., writing 
for himself, asserted that the matter of the resolution is the protection of 
health and well-being of the City’s inhabitants.47 
The Majority’s analysis of pith and substance is sparse. While it is 
true that the doctrine is more akin to an art than science, we might have 
expected a more explicit engagement with the impugned law’s purpose 
and effects. For example, in considering the law’s purpose, Wagner and 
Côté JJ. consider a timeline of events,48 including when the notice of 
reserve was served, and are led to but one conclusion: that the purpose of 
the notice was to prevent Rogers from installing the antenna system at 
the property in question. The Majority’s inquiry into the legal and 
practical effects of the impugned law are even more cursory: in one 
paragraph comprising three sentences, the Majority simply concludes 
that the municipal law had the effect of prohibiting the construction of 
the antenna system.  
In contrast, Gascon J., in considering the purpose of the impugned 
law, detailed the resolution’s preamble and the circumstances 
surrounding the notice of reserve,49 including evidence heard by the trial 
judge of residents’ health concerns. Justice Gascon also noted that the 
legal effect of the notice was to enable the City to exercise its power of 
expropriation, which falls within its jurisdiction, and of course, the 
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practical effect was to prohibit Rogers from constructing its antenna 
system.50 Justice Gascon concluded that, at a minimum, the impugned 
notice engaged the doctrine of double aspect.51 However, the Majority 
rejected this, citing Multiple Access v. McCutcheon52 for the proposition 
that the doctrine only applies “when the contrast between the relative 
importance of the two features is not so sharp”.53 Having concluded that  
the pith and substance of the impugned municipal law was the location of 
the radio communication antenna, Wagner and Côté JJ. could not find an 
equivalence between the federal and the claimed provincial aspect (health). 
To do so would suggest that the province had jurisdiction over the siting of 
such infrastructure, contrary to the precedent established by the Privy 
Council in Re Regulation and Control of Radio Communications in 
Canada, granting exclusive jurisdiction to the federal government.54 
While the majority in Rogers Communications decided the case through 
pith and substance alone, they proceeded to apply the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity to “clarify” the law. This is curious, as the 
analysis itself adds little, if any, new insight and may muddy the waters  
in terms of how these doctrines are to be applied. The Court repeats  
that interjurisdictional immunity is reserved for situations that have  
been sufficiently covered by precedent.55 A 1905 decision then serves as  
the precedent in this case, Toronto Corporation v. Bell Telephone Co. of 
Canada, where the Privy Council held that the siting of radio 
communication antenna systems lies at the core of the federal power, 
ensuring as it does the orderly development and efficient operation of radio 
communications in Canada. The interjurisdictional immunity argument 
proceeds in a very similar fashion to Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian 
Owners and Pilots Assn,56 with the majority concluding that the notice of a 
reserve seriously and significantly impaired the core of the federal power, 
rendering Parliament unable to achieve the purpose for which it was granted 
the power over radio communications.57 What, then, is the ratio of this case? 
One possibility is that these cases over the siting of (often unwanted) 
                                                                                                                       
50 Id., at paras. 103-106. 
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infrastructure such as radio communications antennae and aerodromes have 
a particular logic to them which simply cannot allow for provincial overlap, 
since this would consistently prove ruinous to the federal power.  
The general trend for some time has been more recognition of 
overlapping jurisdiction, and judicial decisions that favour cooperative 
federalism.58 Justice Gascon’s dissent continues this tradition, drawing on 
the principles of presumptive constitutionality, subsidiarity, and cooperative 
federalism to describe a flexible approach “tailored to the modern 
conception of federalism, which allows for some overlapping and favours  
a spirit of cooperation”.59 Justice Gascon cites Professor Hogg for  
the proposition that “in choosing between competing, plausible 
characterizations of a law, the court should normally choose one that would 
support the validity of the law”.60 The Majority, however, disagreed: 
[the principle of cooperative federalism] can neither override nor modify 
the division of powers itself. It cannot be seen as imposing limits on the 
valid exercise of legislative authority [citations omitted.] Nor can it 
support a finding that an otherwise unconstitutional law is valid.61 
The outcome, a case in which jurisdiction is ousted, seems to cut 
against the trend. But it may simply illustrate a more subtle trend. In 
2011, Professor Bruce Ryder noted the centrality of the principle of equal 
autonomy—which accords equal weight and consideration to the claims 
of the legislatures in their exercise of autonomy over distinct policy 
objectives within their jurisdiction—to the Supreme Court’s federalism 
jurisprudence.62 He highlighted the Court’s commitment to a flexible 
vision of federalism that favours a generous interpretation of both federal 
and provincial heads of power; indeed, prior to 2010, the last case where 
a provincial or municipal law was found to be ultra vires through the 
doctrine of pith and substance was the Morgentaler63 decision in 1993. 
Yet, from 2010 onward, Ryder noted an increasing number of fissures 
within the Court as to the vires of impugned provisions. As we near the end 
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of the McLachlin era, it will be interesting to consider the extent to which 
the Court’s jurisprudence reflects a return to the centralist-decentralized 
debates engaged in by Chief Justice Laskin and Beetz J. It is possible to 
read Rogers Communications as another step along that path.  
2. Constitutional Protection of Lawyer/Client Relationships and 
section 8 of the Charter 
Canada (Attorney General) v. Chambre des notaires du Québec et 
Barreau de Québec64 illustrates an interaction between solicitor-client 
privilege and section 8 of the Charter, producing constitutional limits on 
the disclosures that the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) can require in 
the course of its investigations.  
At issue in Chambre des Notaires were sections 231.2 and 231.7 of the 
Income Tax Act (“ITA”), which,65 allowed requirements to be issued  
directly to notaries in Quebec to provide documents relating to their clients 
for tax collection or auditing purposes, and allowed the Minister to apply to 
a court for execution of a requirement sent out pursuant to section 231.2. 
The position of the CRA was that the information sought under the 
requirement fell within the “accounting records” exception set out in the 
definition of solicitor-client privilege (under section 232(1) of the ITA).  
Writing for a unanimous court, Wagner and Gascon JJ. concluded that 
sections 231.2(1), 231.7, and 232(1) violated section 8 of the Charter and 
were thus of no force or effect in relation to Quebec notaries and lawyers 
for all documents protected by professional secrecy. The Court 
characterized professional secrecy as both a legal principle of supreme 
importance and principle of fundamental justice.66 
The Court easily found a violation of the right against unreasonable search 
and seizure. On the one hand, notaries’ clients’ reasonable expectations of 
privacy were implicated because the requirements targeted information or 
documents that would normally be protected by confidentiality.67 The Court 
was clear that the civil and administrative context of the documents captured 
by the ITA’s requirement scheme did not diminish the taxpayer’s expectation 
of privacy. On the other hand, in balancing clients’ individual privacy with 
the state’s interest in carrying out the search or seizure to collect amounts 
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owing to CRA, the Court concluded that the search pursuant to the 
requirement scheme was unreasonable. Specifically, where the privacy 
interest implicates the professional secrecy of legal advisors, the usual 
balancing exercise under section 8 will rarely, if ever, cut against the 
individual’s privacy interest. The Court maintained that a stringent standard is 
necessary in order to protect professional secrecy. This standard means that 
legislative provisions that interfere with professional secrecy in a manner that 
is more than absolutely necessary will be found unreasonable.68 
Several defects in the requirement scheme caused it to fall below this 
stringent standard.69 First, the client of a notary faced with a requirement 
was not given notice.70 Second, an inappropriate burden was placed on 
the notary or lawyer.71 Third, compelling disclosure was not absolutely 
necessary. For example, it is clear that the impugned search was not a 
measure of last resort: the information sought by the Minister could have 
been made available through alternative sources, like financial 
institutions, which do not have the same onerous confidentiality 
requirements as notaries in Quebec.72 Finally, the scheme included no 
measures to help mitigate the impairment of professional secrecy. To 
assist Parliament in drafting a scheme that sufficiently mitigates concerns 
surrounding professional secrecy, Wagner and Gascon JJ. point to a 
directive issued by Revenu Québec, stating that the Revenu will attempt 
to obtain the documents from alternative sources first, and undertake not 
to prosecute a notary who invokes professional secrecy in good faith.73 
The exclusion of notaries’ and lawyers’ accounting records from the 
definition of solicitor-client privilege was also deemed to violate section 8 
of the Charter. The Court was clear that the legislature is not free to 
abrogate professional secrecy by statutory authorizations allowing for the 
seizure of information that would otherwise be exempt from the duty to 
disclose, unless it was absolutely necessary to achieving the scheme’s 
objective. Since the Court was not convinced that giving the State access 
to such protected information was absolutely necessary to realizing the 
objective of tax collection, the broad and imprecise definition of 
solicitor-client privilege did not pass constitutional muster.74 
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In this volume, Amy Salyzyn considers the decision in Chambres des 
notaires. She highlights analytical tensions that emerge in light of the 
Court’s reliance on the Charter, typically used to protect individuals, to 
safeguard the lawyer-client relationship from governmental intrusions. 
Salyzyn notes that in both Chambres des notaires and Canada (Attorney 
General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada75 — the Court 
curiously characterizes solicitor-client privilege as a fundamental 
principle that cannot be interfered with unless the stringent threshold  
of “absolute necessity” is passed, while simultaneously working with  
the rule under section 8 of the Charter, which protects against 
“unreasonable” searches and seizure.  
The result is a constitutional incongruity whereby an extremely high 
threshold is tethered to the concept of reasonableness. Salyzyn queries the 
extent to which this results in the establishment of solicitor-client privilege 
as a constitutional right that supersedes other rights. If so, this could place 
the Court in a “constitutional straightjacket” in future cases. Given the high 
threshold of absolute necessity, Salyzyn also wonders if even the mitigation 
that Wagner and Gascon commended in their reasons would survive 
constitutional scrutiny in any subsequent Charter challenge.  
3. Mandatory Minima: End of a Story? 
Lloyd is the third case since the Charter’s enactment in which the Court 
has struck down a mandatory minimum, the previous two decisions being 
R. v. Smith76 and R. v. Nur.77 In Lloyd, the accused was charged with 
possession of methamphetamine and heroin. Because Mr. Lloyd had 
previously been convicted of several drug-related offences, he was subject 
to section 5(3)(a)(i)(D) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
[hereinafter “CDSA”],78 which required the sentencing judge to impose a 
mandatory sentence of one year. The scope of the impugned provision was 
summarized by Chief Justice McLachlin in the following way:  
To be subject to the mandatory minimum sentence of one year of 
imprisonment, an offender must be convicted of trafficking, or of 
possession for the purpose of trafficking, of either any quantity of a 
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Schedule I substance, such as cocaine, heroin or methamphetamine, or 
three kilograms or more of a Schedule II substance, namely cannabis:  
s. 5(3)(a) and (a.1) of the CDSA. The offender must also have been 
convicted within the previous 10 years of a “designated substance 
offence”, which is defined at s. 2(1) of the CDSA as any offence under 
Part I of the CDSA other than simple possession.79 
Despite the apparent narrowness of the provision, the Majority in 
Lloyd found that the mandatory minimum amounted to cruel and unusual 
punishment, contrary to section 12 of the Charter. Specifically, Chief 
Justice McLachlin maintained that although the impugned provision was 
not grossly disproportionate to the circumstances of the accused in this 
case, it was nonetheless so because the impugned provision applied in 
many situations to offenders with significantly varying degrees of moral 
blameworthiness, and further, because the definition of trafficking and 
the scope of the designated substance offences were too broad.80 
The test for determining if a mandatory minimum sentencing 
provision violates section 12 of the Charter was most recently articulated 
by the Court in Nur. First, the Court must determine what a proportionate 
sentence for an offence would be, having regard to the objectives and 
principles of sentencing in the Criminal Code.81 Second, the Court must 
then consider whether the mandatory minimum imposed by Parliament 
would require the sentencing judge to impose a sentence that is grossly 
disproportionate to the offence and its circumstances.82 
In considering the second step of the analysis, the Chief Justice 
crafted two reasonable hypotheticals to demonstrate how the impugned 
mandatory minimum provision would be grossly disproportionate in 
foreseeable cases. The first hypothetical involves a drug addict who is 
charged for sharing a small amount of a Schedule I drug with a spouse or 
friend. The second hypothetical involves a drug addict who is charged 
with trafficking a Schedule I drug for a second time to support his own 
addiction and who, in between conviction and sentencing, attends 
rehabilitation and overcomes his addiction.83 In both scenarios, the Chief 
Justice concluded that a mandatory sentence of one year would shock the 
conscience of Canadians.84 
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Writing in dissent, Wagner, Gascon, and Brown JJ., asserted that the 
impugned provision was sufficiently tailored and narrow so as not to offend 
section 12 of the Charter,85 and emphasized the degree of deference that 
Parliament is entitled to in crafting mandatory minima.86 The dissenting 
justices also rejected the hypotheticals crafted by the Chief Justice, arguing 
that the minimum would not apply in those scenarios, and even if it did 
apply, the scenarios are akin to the circumstances of Mr. Lloyd, for whom 
the Majority agreed that a one-year sentence was not cruel and unusual.87 
Notable in Lloyd is the Court’s reflection of the specificity and narrowness 
that will be required of Parliament if it is to create constitutionally compliant 
mandatory minima. It seems that the era of proliferating mandatory minima 
through which we have recently lived might well be at an end, an end marked 
by Lloyd. Yet Lloyd also offers fodder for debate in the form of the Court’s 
commentary on the role that statutory exemptions allowing for judicial 
discretion could play in preserving the constitutionality of mandatory 
sentences. The Chief Justice suggests as follows: 
Another solution would be for Parliament to build a safety valve that would 
allow judges to exempt outliers for whom the mandatory minimum will 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Residual judicial discretion for 
exceptional cases is a technique widely used to avoid injustice and 
constitutional infirmity in other countries [citation omitted]… It allows the 
legislature to impose severe sentences for offences deemed abhorrent, 
while avoiding unconstitutionally disproportionate sentences in exceptional 
cases. The residual judicial discretion is usually confined to exceptional 
cases and may require the judge to give reasons justifying departing from 
the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed by the law. It is for the 
legislature to determine the parameters of the residual judicial discretion.88 
Although permitting discretion in the context of mandatory minimum 
sentences might well address some of the excesses and flaws intrinsic to 
mandatory minima, this approach also raises concerns surrounding the 
certainty and predictability expected from the criminal law, which may 
also produce troubling implications for the rule of law,89 an issue that the 
Court seemed concerned with in Ferguson.90  
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The piece by Asad G. Kiyani in this volume addresses the 
uneasiness raised by some that Lloyd’s reading in of highly 
individualistic circumstances into the reasonable hypothetical test 
under section 12 of the Charter may open the floodgates such that it 
will be near impossible for Parliament to craft a mandatory minimum 
scheme that survives constitutional scrutiny. Kiyani argues that such 
concerns are overstated: judicial practice suggests that both before  
and after Lloyd, the courts have preserved mandatory sentences much 
more frequently than they have struck them down. Further, he notes 
that notwithstanding judicial pronouncements on the importance of  
section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code and the Gladue principles, which 
call on the courts to consider the circumstances of racialized offenders 
in determining a just sanction, the jurisprudence on section 12 has 
been silent as to how these factors ought to be relevant in the context 
of a gross disproportionality analysis. For Kiyani, this deficiency in 
conjunction with the Court’s non-recognition of proportionality as a 
principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter further 
subverts any possibility that sections 12 and 15 might be integrated in 
order to address concerns of substantive equality in sentencing and the 
criminal justice system more broadly. Kiyani not only challenges 
readers to consider how race and Aboriginal status have been glossed 
over in the Court’s construction of reasonable hypotheticals under 
section 12 (as in Lloyd, for example), but further, to consider how such 
constructions actually centre around white and male privilege (as in 
Nur, for example).  
4. Widening Police Powers 
On the strength of its decisions on sentencing91 and on the limits of 
substantive criminalization,92 over the past many years the Court has 
benefitted from a developing narrative about its progressive, skeptical 
take on the expansion of crime and punishment through the criminal law. 
In many instances, it has been positioned as the counterweight to a 
government with a “tough on crime” agenda. And yet over those same 
years there has been a quiet countercurrent in the Court’s constitutional 
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work in the criminal law, marked by a significant and steady expansion 
of police powers.93 R. v. Saeed94 further illustrates this trend.95  
At issue in the case was whether the common law power of search 
incident to arrest authorizes penile swabs to secure the DNA of 
complainants from suspects in the course of sexual assault investigations. 
The case produces three sets of reasons that highlight deep fissures as to 
the appropriate authorities that ought to be applied in determining the 
reasonableness of the impugned search in the context of section 8 of the 
Charter. On the one hand, the samples that are acquired from a penile 
swab are akin to the seizure of bodily samples, for which the Stillman96 
framework could apply; on the other, penile swabs can be seen as 
significantly interfering with the bodily integrity and dignity of a suspect, 
which would seem to implicate the considerations identified around strip 
searches in Golden.97 
Writing for the Majority, Moldaver J. concluded that although penile 
swabs amount to a significant intrusion on the privacy interests of 
suspects, such swabs will be reasonable where, as in this case, police 
have “reasonable grounds to believe that the search will reveal and 
preserve evidence of the offence for which the accused was arrested, and 
the swab is conducted in a reasonable manner”.98 Drawing on Golden as 
a framework, Moldaver J. identified 10 factors that Courts may draw on 
to discern the reasonableness of penile swabs.99 
For Moldaver J., Stillman did not apply to create a requirement for 
police to obtain consent or a warrant to seize bodily samples or 
impressions. This is because, in contrast to the bodily samples or 
impressions protected under Stillman, a penile swab is not designed to seize 
the bodily samples of the accused; rather, it is the complainant’s DNA that 
is sought.100 Accordingly, a penile swab does not implicate the same 
privacy interests of an accused person, since no personal information of the 
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suspect is revealed.101 Furthermore, in contrast to the taking of dental 
impressions or the removal of hair from a suspect’s body, Moldaver J. 
posits that a penile swab is less invasive in that it does not involve 
penetration or the placement of objects or substances inside the suspect.102 
Finally, evidence of the complainant’s DNA that is sought via the swab 
degrades over time and can be destroyed by the accused, implicating 
concerns about the preservation of reliable evidence.103 
Justices Karakatsanis and Abella disagreed. Specifically, Karakatsanis J. 
maintained that although Stillman did not expressly address the issue of 
genital swabs, the principles underlying that decision suggest that an 
inappropriate balance would be struck between privacy interests and the 
state’s interest in investigating crimes if the common law authorized 
warrantless genital swabs.104 Notwithstanding the unreasonableness of the 
search, Karakatsanis J. held that the evidence was properly admitted. 
Justice Abella was the sole judge to find that the penile swab violated 
section 8 of the Charter and was not properly admissible under section 24(2) 
of the Charter. The empassioned tone of her dissent is captured at 
paragraph 167, where she asserts: 
[T]he deliberate failure to consider a warrant in the absence of exigent 
circumstances is, at its best, careless; ignoring the legal possibility that 
under Canadian law the police were not even entitled to take a penile 
swab, is fatal. 
The article by Christine Mainville in this volume argues that 
Moldaver J.’s reasoning overstates the importance of the informational 
privacy impacted by the swab (the complainant’s DNA) and fails to 
sufficiently account for the personal privacy interest that is inherently 
engaged when genitalia are searched. For Mainville, the assumption that 
a penile swab is not as invasive as the samples and impressions described 
in Stillman is unfounded. 
5. Jordan and the Right to be Tried Within a Reasonable Time 
Perhaps the most controversial decision released in 2016 — and 
certainly the one with the most immediately sweeping impact on the 
administration of justice in Canada — was Jordan,105 in which a deeply 
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split106 Court revamped the framework for addressing the right to be tried 
within a reasonable time. At the heart of the new scheme is the 
establishment of presumptive ceilings, which, if surpassed, will lead to a 
presumption that accused’s rights under section 11(b) have been violated. 
The presumptive ceilings for trials proceeding in Provincial Court and 
Superior Court are, respectively, 18 and 30 months.107 Delays caused by 
the defence are subtracted from the total delay.108 For the Crown to  
rebut the presumption of unreasonableness that would otherwise give rise 
to a stay of proceedings, it must establish the presence of exceptional 
circumstances.109  
Writing in dissent, Cromwell J. charged the Majority’s approach as 
unnecessary and unlikely to inject simplicity into the law, highlighting 
that inquiries into the reasonableness of time is a delicate, fact-sensitive 
and case-specific exercise that cannot adequately be accounted for 
through use of blunt tools like presumptive ceilings.110 He further 
maintained that the setting of ceilings is a polycentric enterprise that is 
better left to the legislature, and that the ceilings selected by the Majority 
do not accord with the past 10 years of section 11(b) jurisprudence.111 
Finally, Cromwell J. expressed the concern that the “ceilings will put 
thousands of cases at risk of being judicially stayed”.112 
Two pieces in this volume grapple with the decision in Jordan and 
offer insight into how the Court’s deployment of presumptive ceilings  
is perhaps unsurprising and indeed responsive to various problems 
generated by previous section 11(b) jurisprudence. Steve Coughlan 
provides a historically and sociologically rich analysis on the distinction 
between individual and institutional delay and competing notions of 
prejudice, and how these factors influenced not only the development  
of the law surrounding unreasonable delay, but moreover, the attitudes of 
actors within the criminal justice system.  
Coughlan further argues that the establishment of presumptive 
ceilings was necessary to address the tendency of trial judges to use the 
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judicial discretion under the previous Morin113 regime to explain away 
delay. He argues, the main problem harkens back to a concern first 
expressed by Lamer J., as he then was, in Rahey.114 Specifically, Lamer J. 
posited that security of the person prejudice should be sufficient to 
establish a violation of the right enshrined by section 11(b) of the 
Charter, and further, that liberty and fair trial prejudices should be 
irrelevant to the analysis.115 This view was ultimately not accepted by the 
Court in subsequent cases like Askov.116 For Coughlan, the concern 
expressed by Lamer J. foreshadowed problems that quickly materialized 
in the section 11(b) jurisprudence: because evidence of liberty and fair 
trial prejudice cases made some cases appear stronger than others, cases 
advanced solely on the basis of security of the person prejudice appeared 
weak, with the effect that institutional delay was overlooked. 
Palma Paciocco also offers thoughtful insight into possible practical 
consequences that may flow from Jordan, which would be contrary to 
the interests of the public and accused persons. Specifically, she 
cautions that excising actual prejudice suffered from the analysis may 
have the effect of incentivizing the Crown to pressure accused persons 
to enter into guilty pleas at increased rates, which would produce 
negative implications for fair trial rights. Moreover, she posits that the 
absence of actual prejudice renders uncertain how section 11(b) will 
accommodate young offenders who, on account of having different 
perceptions of time and a reduced ability to appreciate the connection 
between actions and consequences, experience delay prejudice 
differently than adult accused. 
6. Proportionality as a Principle of Fundamental Justice  
Over the last 20 years, proportionality reasoning has found its way 
deep into the constitutional jurisprudence addressing the criminal justice 
system and legal rights,117 just as it has become the mainstay of Charter 
jurisprudence at large. One might say that momentum in this direction 
reached an apex with LeBel J.’s suggestion in Ipeelee that “proportionality 
in sentencing could aptly be described as a principle of fundamental 
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justice under s. 7 of the Charter”.118 Would this mean that criminal laws 
(all of which intrinsically implicate the liberty interest under section 7) 
could be challenged for “mere” disproportionality?  
Viewed in this frame, along with Lloyd, the Court’s decision in R. v. 
Safarzadeh-Markhali119 no doubt left criminal law lawyers and scholars 
with mixed feelings. 
On the one hand, the Court’s use of section 7 of the Charter in 
Safarzadeh-Markhali illustrates the vigour of the principle of overbreadth 
in Charter litigation120 and clarified the proper methodology to employ 
when expounding the purpose of an impugned provision or statute in  
the context of section 7.121 The Court found that section 719(3.1) of the 
Criminal Code, which made enhanced credit unavailable to offenders who 
were denied bail primarily because of prior convictions, violated section 7 
in that it was overbroad in relation to its purpose: the impugned provision 
had the effect of catching a broad range of offenders in ways that do not 
contribute to the enhancement of public safety and security.122 
On the other hand, both here and in Lloyd the Court rejected the 
Respondent’s and Ontario Court of Appeal’s assertion that the principle 
of proportionality was a freestanding principle of fundamental justice 
within the meaning of section 7.123 Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief 
Justice McLachlin in Safarzadeh-Markhali maintained that the principle of 
proportionality in sentencing enshrined in section 718.1 of the Criminal 
Code and Ipeelee, though fundamental, is not a principle of fundamental 
justice and does not have constitutional status. She reiterated that the 
“constitutional dimension” of proportionality in sentencing is the prohibition 
of grossly disproportionate sentences under section 12 of the Charter.124 
Similarly, in Lloyd, the Chief Justice asserted that the principles of 
fundamental justice in section 7 must be defined in a way that promotes 
both coherence within the Charter and conformity to the appropriate 
institutional roles of Parliament and the Judiciary.125 Specifically, she 
notes126 that the recognition of proportionality as a free-standing principle of 
                                                                                                                       
118 R. v. Ipeelee, [2012] S.C.J. No. 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, 2012 SCC 13, at para. 37 
(S.C.C.).  
119 Safarzadeh-Markhali, supra, note 1.  
120 Id., at paras. 50-55. 
121 Id., at paras. 24-49. 
122 Id., at para. 52. 
123 Id., at paras. 67-73. 
124 Safarzadeh-Markhali, supra, note 1, at 70.  
125 Lloyd, supra, note 1, at para. 40.  
126 Id., at para. 42. 
(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d) OVERVIEW lxvii 
fundamental justice would be inconsistent with the Court’s decision in 
Malmo-Levine, in which the Court stated that sections 7 and 12 of the 
Charter cannot impose different standards with respect to the proportionality 
of punishment:  
Is there then a principle of fundamental justice embedded in s. 7 that 
would give rise to a constitutional remedy against a punishment that 
does not infringe s. 12? We do not think so. To find that gross and 
excessive disproportionality of punishment is required under s. 12 but  
a lesser degree of proportionality suffices under s. 7 would render 
incoherent the scheme of interconnected “legal rights” set out in ss. 7  
to 14 of the Charter by attributing contradictory standards to ss. 12 and 7 
in relation to the same subject matter. Such a result, in our view, would 
be unacceptable.127 
Furthermore, the Chief Justice in Lloyd cautioned that the recognition of 
proportionality as a principle of fundamental justice would destabilize 
institutional dynamics by allowing judges to subvert the norms of 
punishment generated by Parliament — a matter which is properly within 
the realm of policy choices to which Parliament is owed deference.128 
Interestingly, in both Safarzadeh-Markhali and Lloyd, the Court did 
not even attempt to apply the framework for analyzing whether a 
principle of fundamental justice could be established.129  
The article in this volume by Andrew Menchynski and Jill R. Presser 
considers the Markhali decision and argues that the Court’s focus on the 
principles of gross disproportionality, overbreadth, and arbitrariness in 
recent section 7 jurisprudence produces a troubling set of implications 
for the role that section 7 of the Charter may have in advancing 
substantive rights in the future. Specifically, the authors argue that the 
Court’s emphasis on instrumental rationality ensures only that the 
objective and means of an impugned provision are aligned, and that this 
may frustrate the philosophical foundation of section 7 as a vehicle 
through which minority groups can secure substantive protection under 
the Charter. For Menchynski and Presser this is concerning, because in 
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their view, the utility of arbitrariness and overbreadth will diminish since 
Parliament exercises influence over the sources through which legislative 
purpose is determined. Moreover, analyses on instrumental rationality do 
not entrench in stare decisis in a substantive way, even though such 
principles may be used to strike down substantively wrong laws. Finally, 
the authors express a concern that a commitment to instrumental 
rationality only precludes the Charter from functioning as a living tree 
that recognizes the progressive social values of the day. 
7. K.R.J. and the Interplay Between the Rule of Law and the 
Liberal and Purposive Approach to interpreting section 11 
Charter rights 
K.R.J. is a case that shows an interplay between the Court’s concern for 
the rule of law and its commitment to a liberal and purposive approach to 
delineating the scope of rights guaranteed under the Charter. Specifically, 
the case addressed the question of whether section 161(1) of the Criminal 
Code—which restricts the liberty interests of convicted sexual offenders 
who pose an ongoing risk to children through means such as prohibitions 
against using computer systems to communicate with minors and using the 
Internet generally—constitutes “punishment” within the meaning of 
section 11(i) of the Charter. This, in turn, determines the constitutionality 
of their retroactive application to K.R.J. 
In finding that the impugned prohibition orders constitute punishment, 
the Court recalibrated the test under section 11 to clarify when measures 
aimed at public protection will amount to punishment, having regard to the 
impact the measure has on the offender’s liberty and security interests. 
Specifically, in K.R.J. a third consideration was added to the test under 
section 11. Under the new approach a measure will be punishment where: 
(1) It is a consequence of conviction that forms part of the arsenal of 
sanctions to which an accused may be liable in respect of a particular 
offence, and either  
(2) it is imposed in furtherance of the purpose and principles of  
sentencing, or 
(3) it has a significant impact on an offender’s liberty or security interests.130 
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The piece by Stacey D. Young in this volume posits that the decision in 
K.R.J. will invite future litigation on ancillary orders, which the author 
notes have proliferated in recent years. Specifically, Young posits the 
decision in K.R.J. may change the categorization of forfeiture orders for 
offence-related property such that they are now punishment within the 
meaning of section 11. For example, the use of property in the commission 
of an offence may have the effect of tainting the property, such that it is 
properly the subject of a forfeiture order under Part XII.2 of the Criminal 
Code. Because such an order may remove the offender’s ability to deal 
with their property, it is possible that their liberty or security interests may 
be significantly impacted, which, under the third prong of the test 
articulated in K.R.J., could result in the order amounting to punishment.  
For Young, the Court’s decision in K.R.J. signifies a less deferential 
approach to Parliament and suggests that it will no longer be sufficient to 
generate measures or sanctions aimed primarily at public protection to 
evade characterization as punishment and thereby shield the measure 
from scrutiny under section 11 of the Charter. Notwithstanding that the 
purpose of a measure may indeed be public protection, the impact that 
the impugned measure has on an offender must now be considered: if the 
measure rises to the level of punishment, its retroactive application will 
be contrary to section 11 of the Charter. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The contributions to this volume offer a rich and lively entry point 
into not only understanding key dimensions of the Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence in 2016, but larger themes with which the Court, judges, 
lawyers, and scholars are actively wrestling. As we have suggested, 
foremost among those larger themes are questions about the political and 
institutional role of the Court within the constitutional “architecture” of 
the country, and in particular, the way in which the Supreme Court of 
Canada will play its part in the defining question of our contemporary 
constitutional moment: is there a route through reconciliation to a just 
relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state?  
As we look ahead, and with this challenge — on which she has shone a 
spotlight — in mind, it is impossible to ignore the pending retirement of the 
Chief Justice of Canada, Beverley McLachlin, who has led the Court since 
January 7, 2000. We look forward to contributing to the reflection on the 
full shape and import of her legacy in these pages next year.  
 
